Abstract
The Turn to Interests
The existence of a norm presupposes a common political project or political conflict. When there is valid legislation on an issue, a state, an individual, or a corporation can act and invoke the protection of law. Many of the political conflicts of society are therefore resolved by the very act of creating norms.
1 While the previous statement appears both rational and reasonable, simultaneously, this article adds something fundamental century used the philosophy of the tradition of interests in their work. Some of them shared at least three further common features: the aim of producing a science of law, a belief in the importance of purging the norms of international law from morality, and, crucially, the ambition to imbue the new international law with the quality of universality. Lassa Oppenheim, the author of 'by common consent the outstanding and most frequently employed systematic treatise on the subject [of international law] in the English-speaking countries', 21 and Hans Kelsen, the legal theoretician of the 20th century, 22 were among the most important of these jurists in shaping the future theory of international law. 23 Nonetheless, this article is concerned with the analysis of two members of the next generation of 20th century international legal positivists, who are described here as such mainly due to their more sophisticated elaboration of international legal positivism and on the basis of their work originating in the tradition of interests.
Following the positivist tradition of the previous century (of Travers Twiss (1809-1897), Karl Bergbohm, and Judge Holmes (1841-1935)), the economic aspect of international legal positivism was integrated in law in the manner in which its proponents created the objectivity of the science of law through purification and system. Oppenheim took the view that what united states was their interests. Politics, however, could not be redeemed; law had to be purified from politics, religion, and morality in order to enable the formation of a system of international law. Kelsen regarded the real and political world -or, as he called it, the world of Sein -as being economic in a deeply theoretical manner: everyone competes for their interests with everyone else. Interests are therefore an integral part of an epistemological and ontological view of the world. Thus for the law to be objective and value-free it has to be purified of reality. Furthermore, the pure law corresponds with the need for a system that assumes the universal experience of the struggle of interests.
During the 20th century, international legal positivists condensed, as it were, the new theoretical foundation of international public law into the concept of interests and constructed reality anew through interests ranging from the 'common interests' of the family of nations (Oppenheim) to the 'struggle of interests' of neoliberal democracy (Kelsen) . Therefore, the theoretical change of scenario in the foundation of interests was a movement from morality to economy, and interests became a pattern that provided for order. For this reason, and unlike previous members of the tradition, in their treatment of the notion of 'interests', 20th century legal positivists no longer analysed how self-interest constructed society. Despite their individualism they took society for granted, as a historical or biological fact.
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The specific meaning and content of the concept of interests seem to vary within the tradition, but at the same time maintain a fixed value of an economic nature. In particular, international legal positivists viewed interests as being generally connected to commercial and economic activities. And while 'interests' often also referred to political interests, they were as such also increasingly described in a materialistic sense. Oppenheim's view was that political interests should still be located outside law because they are 'political'. Kelsen, on the other hand, was comfortable placing them alongside strictly economic interests and, for this reason, political, security, and other similar interests become equally the potential object of exchange or competition in this theoretical framework. No longer does politics constitute a social space in which to discuss the just, the good, or even the survival of the state, but it resembles the clear contours of a physical market in which different values appear in competition. This specific feature lies behind the characterization of the type of 20th century international legal positivist thought described in this article as economic-legal positivism.
Within this new tradition of interests, during the past century international lawyers discovered their mission in studiously determining the content of interests:
Where the nineteenth century sought the vindication of natural rights, it must be our task to vindicate and evaluate interests.
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As a mainstream current of thought in international law even today, positivism asserts the law as it is, and not as it should be; it is usually voluntarist as to the origin of norms, and in its most analytical form it seeks a strict separation of law from reason, morality, and political ideologies and realities. 26 It is commonplace to refer to the impossibility of pinpointing the concrete meaning of an abstract 'positivism', and indeed many different authors have produced competing definitions of the notion, often employing for that the particular positivism of a determined author. 27 as a historical reality, 20th century international legal positivism has evolved with concrete and defined features. My argument does not attempt to trace all these different nuances of 20th century international legal positivism, but limits itself to the more modest task of contending that legal positivism developed a certain economic form that permitted certain types of legal content and blocked other types of content where these were deemed inimical to its political intuitions. The reason for this is the foundational position of interests in the new theory. This argument is analysed in the next section through an examination of the universalism of 'common interests' in Lassa Oppenheim's new international law and its discontinuity with previous theories of international legal positivism. I suggest that the breach may be seen in the changes introduced with regard to the treatment of native populations. The following section seeks to illustrate the different ways in which reality is understood as a mass of interests by positivists through important principles developed in Kelsen's legal theory, and to advance the thesis that the theory of the normative neutrality of legal positivism is misleading. Adopted as a fundamental premise, both 'interests' and the 'conflict of interests' determine the nature of the political theory about law and the remedies considered most appropriate for the international order. Remarkably, when employed as a foundational element 'interests' distort the political reality. On the one hand, when political conflicts are transformed into 'conflicts of interests', the ideal of law becomes 'neutrality' -the logicization of equality towards all sorts of positions -to which Kelsen once referred.
28
. The world itself becomes a substance for bargaining: merely interests. On the other hand, adjudication becomes the central technique to resolve conflicts within the legal order. However, because they are equal, no justice can be imposed over interests: interests must be balanced.
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The article concludes with a critique which argues that the focus on the notion of 'interests' offers a reductionist view of humanity and a distorted vision of the reality of the international affairs of states, as well as of international and of domestic society -much more unites or, sometimes, divides individuals, peoples, and states than the abstraction produced by a philosophy of interests grounded in economy is able to articulate. Occasionally, focus on interests causes the greatest injustice in the name of the neutrality of law. It is in this sense that, together with Kingsbury and Donaldson, the article submits that 'interests prove a very fragile foundation for an international 30 However, to state that current positive international law is economic would be a claim exceeding the ambitions of this text. Statehood, diplomacy, security, the practice of international law in diverse international fora, or the specific projects within international law (human rights law, economic law, environmental law, humanitarian law) have political and ideological complexity 31 that cannot be simplistically labelled as economic -and indeed that will not be attempted here. Instead, this article aims to uncover the important philosophical and theoretical contribution of positivists to an economic understanding of international law. Does this necessarily mean that the insights of the economic-positivists have been perfectly implemented and integrated within the current international legal order? Perhaps the right answer to this question is to state that the legal theories of economic-positivism have become part of the assets of international legal theory, and it is for those who want to benefit from them to use them. Furthermore, it is a fact that the following stand out among the main trends observable in current international law: the development of a single system of universal law and of a unitary concept of law without reference to transcendence or to morality, together with an emphasis on the administrative style that this unification brings about in the working of international institutions; the foregrounding of international legal adjudication in international legal matters, and the participation of the individual in such adjudication. Each of these directions also constitutes a key theoretical contribution for the structural changes needed in law to adapt to a (neoliberal) economic understanding of the world. Lassa Oppenheim's and Hans Kelsen's work inspired a novel theoretical approach to these orientations during the 20th century, a matter that is the background theme throughout this article.
The Universalism of Common Interests
In definitively purging law of its transcendent quality -that is, of a reference, beyond the norms themselves, to God, to (human) nature, or to an ideal rationality, or indeed to a combination of all three -the international legal positivists of the past century made the 'economic' the dominant element of positivist international law.
32 I use 'economic' to refer to the mode of reasoning that explains both non-economic and economic realities solely as 'interests'. 30 Certainly, the 'economic' component in the foundation of international law was not invented during the late 19th century. Arguably, it was Grotius and possibly, during an earlier period, the Spanish Scholastics of the 16th century who started to develop a feasible law for the economy of the Spanish Empire, thus laying the foundations for an economic international law. 33 Grotius's purification of the notion of jus, which had the result of concentrating on jus as 'right' -more specifically, as 'my right' -produced international law with a strong bias towards individualist morality. 34 Continuing these traditions, authors like Lassa Oppenheim concentrated on introducing innovations in international law grounded on economic theory, this time highlighting the value of the unifying power of interests to enhance the universal aspirations of positivist international law.
Oppenheim's importance in shaping the history of international law during the 20th century lies in the fact that through his new positivist theory he successfully articulated a normative vision of international law in which law merely reports on the apolitical reality of the world. The marked ideological bias of positivist international law in favour of economic interests emerged beyond that modest statement of principles, as did its historical reaction to the colonial question -which, for the most part, amounted to ignorance of the problem. The new legal science successfully contained that political core and Oppenheim's work was instrumental in bringing about its theoretical development in an erudite and enduring manner. From that point on and according to Oppenheim, states were bound by common interests, and the new foundations of international positivist law were thus laid down.
But what kinds of interests united Oppenheim's international community, which he called the 'Family of Nations'? There were religious ideas that wound 'a band' around the civilized states, which were for the most part Christian states. Science and art were also by their nature international and could, to a great extent, 'create a constant exchange of ideas and opinions between the subjects'. But, since not even the most powerful empire could produce everything its subjects needed, the output of agriculture and industry called for exchange. That is why international trade constituted an 'unequalled factor' that promoted intercourse between states. International trade was the basis for navigation on the high seas and on the rivers. Trade, as a creator, would 'call into existence' the nets of railways covering the continents, and the international means of communication. Those 'manifold interests', which caused constant intercourse between states were the reason for the existence of ambassadors and consuls. Despite the fact that individual states enjoyed sovereignty and independence, there was something stronger than all the powerful factors causing disunity: 'namely, the common interests'. Thus, 'without the pressure exercised upon the States by their interests' legally binding rules would never have come into existence. 35 In each of his texts Oppenheim made it clear that it was by 'the growth, the strengthening and the deepening of international economic and other interests, and of international morality' 36 that the Family of Nations and international law would progress. 37 After all, there were 'eternal and economic factors working in its favour'. No doubt 'the economic and other interests of states' had promoted arbitration among states and were succeeding in the setting up of international courts.
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But the interests binding modern states together were 'primarily' of an economic nature. 39 The more spiritual notions of art, science, and religion were international ideas, but he made no use of them in the development of his theory. For instance, in describing the range of dominion of the Law of Nations, he considers how the Law of Nations was a product of Christian civilization, pointing out that formerly no intercourse existed between Christian states on one side and Mohammedan and Buddhist states on the other. But since the beginning of the 19th century matters had started to change. Economic interests had emerged in relationships between people of different religions. Although there was still 'a deep gulf between Christian civilisation and others, many interests, which knit Christian States together knit likewise some nonChristian and Christian States'. 40 The nub of the issue here is not that his openness towards non-Christian states was wrong or misplaced. Never, after all, had Europe avoided intercourse with those capable of helping it to prosperity. 41 From the outset, designing an international legal order grounded in economic interests could be thought of as economistic but unproblematic: simply a timely choice. The questionable aspect, however, arises when things other than interests are at stake. There were pressing non-economic international issues to be settled in Oppenheim's time, just as there are today. Ethical problems in the colonization enterprise and the hostility developing between European industrial countries called for a legal perspective, but crucially not an economic one. This economic law was of necessity blind to those questions and problems. It was in this manner that the focus on economic interest was an important step in foreclosing further discussion on the theory of international law, which during this period focused mainly 35 Oppenheim, supra note 15, at 10, 11, 12, 17. 36 Oppenheim's fluid understanding of morality can be grasped in L. Oppenheim, Das Gewissen (1898). 37 He never specifies what the other interests are, but rather refers to the growth of means of communication like the telegraph, railway, and so on: Oppenheim, supra note 15, at 33. 38 Ibid., at 5. 39 'Economic interests, primarily, but many others also, prevent individual states from allowing the international community of states to remain unorganized any longer': L. Oppenheim, The Future of International Law (trans. J.P. Bate, 1921). at 66. 40 Oppenheim, supra note 15, at 31 (emphasis mine). 41 See the portrait of the 16th century city-state of Venice as a worldly place, in which the foreign (Turkish, Greek, Jewish, and Germanic communities) was, ambiguously, both welcomed and segregated: Johns, 'Global Governance: An Heretical History Play', 4 Global Jurist Advances (2004) 1.
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http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from on commercial exchange and various forms of economic exploitation. 42 'Interests', oddly, claimed monopoly over normativity, being at the centre of the theory and becoming the measure of the ethical value of the legal enterprise. Interests built the firm foundation to which the rules of law could be referred, providing for the objectivity of law. In Oppenheim's legal discourse devoted to interests we do not find any social, cultural, or ethical enterprise of value to law beyond the consideration of interests.
Arguably, his adoption of the notion of 'common interests' as the central theoretical tool for the International Law is the main novelty of Oppenheim's positivism. 43 International law, he affirmed, ought to comprise only positive law: rules with no mingling with moral or religious categories beyond the facts of the rules themselves which were thought to originate from convention among the states. But Oppenheim considered that due to the 'common interests' international law tended to universality.
Much of 19th century positivist international law had been based on distinctions between civilized and uncivilized peoples -or, as the German put it, between those who deserved to be part of the international legal community and those who could count only on being protected on the basis of principles of humanity. 44 The critical step prompted by the new form of pragmatism, which founded the international community essentially on 'common interests', was putting an end to the moral discussion carried on by earlier positivists. Therefore, the novel priorities of the 'politics of interest' of international law are revealed by observing how legal positivists applied their theories to non-Europeans. Certainly legal positivism followed the power-politics of 42 The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which can stand for another type of humanitarian law, were two events immersed in the political complexity of a time of internal and external hegemonic shifts, and as such very difficult to interpret. Whether the powers were preparing for an impending war or whether they were committed to international peace and had a wish to organize the world, the truth is that the conferences served as experiments for the feasibility of 'universal' conferences. In The Hague, the spirit of the Chevaliers in a duel, of the 'civilized fight', went hand in hand with securing the routes and means for neutral trade despite aggression and with initiating an international means for the settlement of disputes. In view of technical developments, the anxiety of the powers about modern techniques of warfare was evidently justified, although the commitments expressed in the negotiations as to the reduction of the more obnoxious forms of armament were often watered down. The Russian circular note proposing the first conference declared that 'the maintenance of general peace and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments … is in conformity with the most essential interests and the day when adopting its normative stands. 45 The new theories of the legal positivists, who can rightly be called the successors of the Gentle Civilizers, 46 accommodated the practice of the European powers and of the US and reflect an era of optimistic pragmatism. 47 With regard to the colonies, this found expression in increasing matter-of-fact policies in the acquisition of populated territories overseas. By describing colonization single-mindedly as 'interests', the responsibilities of the colonial powers were abolished. The question was stated clearly in German colonial policy directives:
It does not fall within the programme of German colonial policy to enter into the construction of state institutions among the barbaric tribal peoples, and to establish there a similar order of administration and justice, according to our conceptions: Reasoning of the draft law on the 'Fight against the Slave Trade and Protection of the German Interests in West Africa'. 48 Albert Hänel (1833-1919), a leading constitutional law professor, commented, with regard to this policy statement that that was an obvious position where the Reich had no effective control (effektive Herrschaft) over the territories. But even where there was that effective control, the colonial power did not guarantee the native population the minimum condition that would permit one to speak of a state-community (staatliche Gemeinschaft).
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How then did the new pragmatic turn in international law come about? If we take the case of Oppenheim's epoch-making treatise of international law, quite simply, realities that fell outside the category of 'common interests' disappeared from the list of issues dealt with in the book. Specifically, native populations were in a position that made them ineligible to share the 'common interests' of the Family of Nations; thus they were excluded from the discussion. This is evident both in Oppenheim's and in others' discussion of the treaties signed with the indigenous populations of potential colonies, who appear, not as the Other, but rather as non-existent partners:
The growing desire to acquire vast territories as colonies on the part of States unable to occupy effectively such territories at once has, in the second half of the nineteenth century, led to the contracting of agreements with the chiefs of natives inhabiting unoccupied territories, by 45 See recently Fitzmaurice, who on the one hand describes the resistance of some liberals to continue the practices of empire, but on the other ascertains that 'the assurances made at Berlin regarding the property rights of native peoples were ignored by most colonial states in Africa, which deprived the native farmers and pastoralists of their Oppenheim's abandonment of the 19th century moralist rhetoric of statesmen and lawyers alike with regard to the indigenous populations of Africa could be termed 'pragmatic', but not scientifically progressive. When one compares his and others' position on this issue with previous investigations on the topic of the relationship between tribes and their territories, one finds elaborate discussions on what was indeed a complex question. In the discussion which took place around the middle of the 19th century with regard to the status of nomadic tribes within the state, far more complexity was conveyed and much more accuracy as to the practices of land tenure actually in used in Africa 52 and as to the political organization of the tribes, for instance by Carl Viktor Fricker (1830-1907), a German legal philosopher and constitutional lawyer, author of the influential booklet, 'On the State Territory': Do the nomad states have no territory? And if this is the case, does this mean that they are not states? Or does this rather mean that the state does not need a territory? We reply to this: The state cannot be thought without territory, the nomad states are real states and they have a state territory. ... The state does not possess constitutional elements in its concept that only a highly developed people could be able to accomplish. The state appears wherever human beings are bound by a legal order. … And it is certain that where the nomad tribe pitches its tents that is its territory, at that place no other state can perform its activity at the same time. Kenya (1968) , at 176-189.The encouragement of European settlement in Kenya is considered today to have been irrationally done due to the systematic deprivation of indigenous populations of land that followed. Sorrenson demonstrated the British Empire's refusal to take responsibility for the indigenous populations in that process through a review of the legal opinions of the Colonial Office that advised against the sale of land. The Colonial Office affirmed that it effectively went against the law because the Crown could not occupy uninhabited land outside the protectorate, and thus could give no land away to the settlers. However, soon the Government agreed to deal with unoccupied land: ibid., at 44-58; see also the much more elaborate argument in previous centuries on the constitutional and political status of the Mohegans surrounding the dispute over land between them and the Colony of Connecticut: '[t]he Indians though Living amongst the Kings Subjects in these Countries, are a Separate and Distinct People from them, they are treated with as Such, they have a Polity of their own, they make Peace and War with any Nation of Indians when they think fit, without controul from the English'; quoted in Walters, supra note 50, at 820. Clearly, Fricker and Oppenheim presented two very different ways of thinking about the world and the way in which it is organized. The observations by the former of the 'reality of human societies' and by the latter of 'common interests' produce two types of law, in terms both of substance and of form. In the context of the colonization and economic conquest of the world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the complexity of reality was drastically mitigated by sharp strikes on legal theory adapting to the demands of action. 54 Further, the new concerns expressed by international legal positivism, revolved round how to continue to empower private capital without transferring onto it and the state the burden of the political administration of new territories and peoples located geographically apart.
55 Proposals abound and they can be divided into three groups. One possibility was to back the private entrepreneurs by public law. We might recall that British international lawyer Travers Twiss (1809-1897) argued against the anarchic principles of neutrality and put forward the principle that only under the protection of sovereignty could commerce truly prosper. And his argument for 'free trade only under sovereignty', as Fitzmaurice explains, prevailed in Berlin: Leopold II's Congo Free State was established.
56 Fully and uncompromisingly supported by the first serious international legal-positivists, Oppenheim included, the creation of artificial states was utopian. One could not create entities similar to the Congo Free States around the globe, and the Congo Free State itself came to a dramatic and disastrous end.
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Another possibility was to allow the creation of spheres of influence with equal commercial and investments opportunities, for which efficiently operating international law was a vital prerequisite. The American international lawyers who worked in connection with Oppenheim -particularly Elihu Root (1845-1937) and James Brown Scott (1866-1943) -developed this type of legalist-formalist style focused on the movement from arbitration to court, the codification of rules, the rules of the law of the sea, of warfare, and of the collection of debts. Rather than advocating a realpolitik paradigm in international law, these international lawyers contributed to a legalist foreign policy that would prove instrumental in assisting American business development overseas. This legalist style was to influence American international law until the 1930s 58 was an early illustration of the importance for a powerful state of securing respect for international law in order to protect its entrepreneurs far from home. 59 In the case of the US, it coincided with the conviction, after its economic stagnation of the 1890s, that a renewed commitment to the pursuit of overseas markets was central to the intellectual and economic recovery of the nation. 60 In a more innovative stroke, Oppenheim declared that in the international sphere private subjects could act beyond the law. Thus, he claimed that not essentially different to the acquisition of a territory by a state:
is the case in which a private individual or a corporation acquires land (together with sovereignty over it) in countries which are not under the territorial supremacy of a member of the Family of Nations. In all such cases acquisition is in practice made either by occupation of hitherto uninhabited land, for instance an island, or by cession from a native tribe living on the land. Acquisition of territory and sovereignty thereon in such cases takes place outside the dominion of the Law of Nations, and the rules of this law, therefore, cannot be applied.' 61 But generalizing that in the international order the activity of private individuals and corporations acquiring sovereignty over territories was outside the law, as Oppenheim suggests in his International Law, was more a circumvention of the problem than a solution. In fact it involved making an exception both of companies and of native tribes, so that the rules of international law could not be applied to them. However, Oppenheim's position in respect of this issue is illuminating in terms of its reference to the universalist ambitions of the new pragmatic positivist law based on common interest. What ought to unite the states in the Family of Nations was, as we saw before, their common 'economic interests, primarily'. Groups and peoples that did not participate in this common economic practice and, indeed, ideology appeared to contemporary observers, like Oppenheim, to be backward. Luigi Nuzzo has recently argued that the 19th century colonial powers encountered serious difficulties in developing their constitutional legal theory for the purposes of empire. 62 Crucially, the problems were caused by what they perceived as an experience of 'detemporalization' -that is, by the fact that what happened in the space of the colonies was temporally incompatible with what was experienced in the mother country. 63 The sense that Italian, and more generally European, public lawyers had of the peoples in the colonies was that they belonged to a previous era. This made attempting to apply the same public law to the mother country and to the colonies an impossible undertaking. At the same time, explaining this issue on the basis that a different place or space was in reality living in a different time enabled lawyers, who were advocates of the rule of law at home, to become absolutists in the colonies. The text by Hänel on imperial law mentioned above is a clear example of this phenomenon. 64 Therefore, Nuzzo argues, European public lawyers resolved their difficulties regarding difference of public institutions, for instance, by applying different types of law to different physical spaces.
Observing Oppenheim's position through the perspective offered by Nuzzo's argument that European public lawyers dealing with imperial territories positioned themselves, not only in different geographical spaces, but also in different epochs, helps one to understand Oppenheim's shift in theory. Oppenheim's disregard of the moral question of the uncivilized peoples, his localization of the matter outside the concerns and jurisdiction of international law, and his granting of 'permission' to private companies to acquire territories and sovereignty 'outside the dominion of the law of Nations' reveals his theory as an extreme example of the problem that public lawyers encountered when dealing with the legal and political reality of the colonies. While Oppenheim himself -and eventually many others in the years to come -viewed his own work, with its new foundation on the common economic interests of states, as being at the cutting edge of the science of international law, native peoples in the newly colonized territories appeared radically cut off from this reality. Arguably, Oppenheim's theoretical move was to look back, not to the Ancien Régime as imperial public lawyers did, but even further back. Oppenheim's solution seems to contemplate the state of nature, in which no positive laws applied. There were then two temporal levels. The first covered those who could participate, through law, in the community of states founded on common interests, which were described as part of the new universal international law; the second those who, as a matter of fact, lived in another era, which was not economic. In any event, Oppenheim's solution was not altogether different from offering native peoples a guarantee of the principles of humanity, but not of law. However, when Oppenheim attributed rights of sovereignty to companies outside the dominion 62 See L. Nuzzo, Origini di una Scienza Diritto internazionale e colonialismo nel XIX secolo (2012), especially at 265-286. 63 Describing the position of the public lawyer Santi Romano Nuzzo states, 'Per il giurista siciliano la colonia viveva in un tempo differente da quello della madre patria, in un tempo che sembrava essere quello vissuto dall'Europa nell'Antico Regime' ('For the Italian jurist the colony lived in a different time from the mother country, in a time that appeared to be the one lived in the Europe of the Ancien Régime'): Nuzzo, supra note 62, at 270. 64 
The Struggle of Interests
As was suggested in the previous section, Oppenheim's turn to common interests in legal science originated in the rise of economy as politics, which came together with the sense of a fated economic interdependence between states and the subsequent schemes for a global economic order. In order to explain and prove the claim that interests were the foundation of Kelsen's positivism as well, and following the advice of Jestaedt and Lepsius on how to engage with Kelsen's legal theory, a great deal of evidence from Kelsen's own writings is presented in this section. 66 Kelsen's legal science was, like Oppenheim's, founded on a philosophy of interests. Nevertheless, within the context of the ideology of interests an important change of scenery occurs with the positivism inaugurated by Kelsen. Interests are no longer a friendly expression of a common family, but the articulation of an existential struggle. Therefore, open scepticism replaces the optimism of early 20th century legal positivism. Law's main task is now to secure both interests and the process of a struggle due to the fact that the former and the latter are accepted as innate to human beings. The Marxist critique of the classic individualist economists to the effect that the legal order did not produce a consistent individualist philosophy, but only concrete individualist economic interests in ridiculous (legal) garments, had been a powerful blow to individualists' attempts to conquer the legal order. 67 By adopting the notion of Darwinist struggle, economic legal-positivism in its second wave appears to be closer to reality, and not simply an apology for certain powerful economic interests. It is in this manner that economic-legal positivism incorporates the Marxist critique and designs its theory precisely as an answer to the Marxists.
In particular, the political aspect in Kelsen's (international) legal theory is revealed in the way he seeks a method for pursuing the evolution of law. Kelsen's method seeks to de-substantialize law; it is thus against a normative approach to law. For him, ' [l] In order for this to work, Kelsen also strips the form of law of values, going far beyond the legal realist distinction of fact and value. 69 In effect values are only formal values for Kelsen: In the field of values, ultimately nothing else can be said with absolute and objective validity save that at the highest point of the pyramid there is nothing else but pure Sollen, free of any content, the abstract form of the values as such form. Despite apparent substantiation, nothing else states the categorical imperative: you ought to do, what you ought to do!
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In the positivistic social sciences, values are only relative, only a means to an end, which can evaluate a social institution conditionally, in the sense of whether it functions or not. Any other standpoint is an absolutist pretension. 71 Moreover, Kelsen's epistemological method also de-substantializes reality. In the world of 'what is', in reality there is no 'substance' or principles able to claim scientific or ontological authority over others. 'Substance' is merely a mask for 'interests' and therefore subjective. In this manner, Kelsen imbues the empty form of law with a new foundation: the reality of interests of the world of 'what is'. In this respect, his method is the outcome of a sceptical type of pragmatic realism. The truth is that he followed the type of analytical philosophy employed by Hume and other empiricists.
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As he correctly assessed, the final product was a genuine analytical jurisprudence. Recent scholarship has indeed noted that there is a large degree of myth in the idea that Kelsen was a (Neo)Kantian.
74
Observed from a broader perspective, Kelsen attempted to construct a legal theory that reflected the world of the 20th century. A disenchanted inheritance of the 19th century captured the globe as a realm of interests and business, in which the political had retreated in the face of economics because science was now that which provided answers to the existential questions. Certainty on natural sciences but scepticism on everything else brought one to discover 'interests' in what had been previously manifestations of religious, cultural, and political life. In a similar way to 'modern science' that sought 'everywhere to dissolve substance into function' and had 'long since thrown the concept of the soul overboard, along with that of force', Kelsen argued that 'the reduction of the supralegal concept of the state to the concept of law is the indispensable precondition for development of a genuine science of law'. And the reason for that was that the 'state', when conceived more than merely as a legal order, was 'intended only to facilitate the satisfaction of political desires, of interests' that were contrary to the positive legal order.
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These were the raw materials for Kelsen to start anew on the concept of law and its science. Certainly one of Kelsen's main achievements was that he forged a highly speculative enterprise, so agreeable to non-common-law lawyers, on the basis of hard-core empiricism. Due to the exceptionalist character of international law -its primitive stage of evolution as he would describe it -Kelsen had to yield to the empirical results of states insisting on acting politically in the international realm. This is reflected in the way in which Kelsen, the scientist, adopted a changing appraisal -trial and error -of method in international law.
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As a rule, it is only when a phenomenon is considered to be universal and in need of protection that legal theorists feel compelled to develop a theory of law with universal scope. This was the case, for instance, of the Spanish scholastics, who believed in God the creator as the foundation of law. 77 It was also true of Hugo Grotius, the Kelsen's general atomist epistemology is his characterization of the identification of the state with the legal order as 'purely epistemic anarchism': Kelsen, 'God and the State', in Kelsen, supra note 74, at 61, 81. 75 Ibid., at 77, 82. 76 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss these points further. However, it might be said that the constant in his international legal theory, the principle of compulsory adjudication, reflects at once his aspiration for universality and the insurmountable figure of the arbitrator among states. For a discussion of Kelsen's methodological development see Garcia-Salmones, supra note 2, for a study of the principle of adjudication as the centre of Kelsen's legal theory see von Bernstorff, supra note 22. 77 According to Koskenniemi, another reason for the universalistic thinking of Spanish theologians like Vitoria or Suarez was that they started to envisage the future global market: Koskenniemi, 'Empire and International Law', supra note 33.
inaugurator of modern international law, who discovered a replacement for divine wisdom in the combination of self-interest, sociability, and reason. 78 The key to understanding Kelsen's universalist thinking is to interpret it as an outcome of his economic view of political life. Conversely, the foundation of that economic politics lies in his philosophical formation. In both cases it is a consequence of totalizing the experience of interests. From the juridical perspective this means that interests and little more are taken to be the object of justice:
Seen from the standpoint of rational cognition, there are only interests and thus conflicts of interests, which are resolved by way of an ordering of interests that either satisfies the one at the expense of the other, or establishes a balance, a compromise between the opposing interests. That only one ordering of interests has absolute value (which really means "is just") cannot be accounted for by way of rational cognition. 79 This statement of Kelsen's, which, seen from a particular perspective could be accurate, loses its value if it becomes a totalizing one. This occurs when the task of law and justice is reduced to being the mere settling of conflicts of interests and the political relations between human beings as a source of those conflicts. Kelsen's much-criticized idea that there cannot be justice among human beings is implied in that reduction:
When already the single human being experiences his particular interest naively as 'right' (Recht), with how much more impetus does every interest-group want to be able to call on 'justice' in order to impose its demands. 80 Crucially, to undermine the work of law so as to make it incapable of justice and to transform that law into an arbiter between interests negates the possibility that among human beings there might be injustice. This last feature is the most conservative aspect of economic-legal positivism.
Kelsen's starting-point for constructing the legal theory founded on interests was his extreme individualism. Evidently in an era when the worst totalitarianisms of history were ripening, that standpoint was not devoid of intrinsic value; although individualism ultimately can be also linked to totalitarian positions.
81 But Kelsen's individualism is complex because it lies in the realm of the normative sciences, and not in nature:
The living together of individuals, in itself a biological phenomenon, becomes a social phenomenon by the fact of being regulated. He parallels the 'social problem', as he calls it, with the religious one. In fact his conception is not very different from the manner in which he understands morality. 83 His analysis views the sociability of men as an expression of an individual's will to subject other individuals and as the creation of something objective from what is subjective, merely a psychological experience. The 'social problem' reveals itself primarily as a psychological experience in individuals' consciousness. In a second stage 'one feels entangled and trapped in this network of ties, enlaced in this structure of relationships, as the dependent part of a whole'. This is the moment in which authority in the form of obligation or social bond takes roots in individual consciousness. The psychology of the social man is nevertheless 'self-subjection under the authority of the group, so that others may be also equally subjected to it'. In a few words, sociability is a means to 'master indirectly' other men. 84 When Kelsen terms law 'a specific social technique' he is not referring to a form of functionalism in which certain social aims are achieved through legislation. 85 There is a much more profound conception in his argument in which the specificity of law crafts society, and it does so through coercion. This is clearly crucial in the international realm, and to a significant extent also explains Kelsen's insistence on security through sanctions and individual criminal responsibility in international law. 86 Social orders (moral, religious, legal) regulating society provide for sanctions, 'advantages or disadvantages' for individuals. But for Kelsen only law is a coercive order. It enacts sanctions that 'are only coercive measures in the sense that certain possessions are taken from the individuals in question against their will.' 87 83 See supra note 2. 84 Kelsen, supra note 75, at 61; 66. 85 But despite his sceptical position about politics occurring essentially on the platform of a struggle of interests, Kelsen thought that democracy was still up to its promise of atomization in the sense of satisfying singularly each individual's yearning for freedom. Democracy, as it were, even in its denaturalisation through the majority principle as self-determination retains still the idea of liberty, something from its original anarchical tendency of dissolving the social totality in individual atoms. 88 Therefore legal order is essential for Kelsen to allow the political struggle of interests' groups and to pursue the promise of democracy of absolute atomistic freedom. The latter is achieved ideally through formal law. The (international) legal theory is aimed at the ideal, at the illusion of grasping legally the individual interest:
The rights and obligations of a juridical person are always rights and obligation of individuals; it is that which a realist theory has to restore.
89
Individualism is articulated on economic terms, for instance in the positive light with which he observed '"the anarchy" of production' occurring within the capitalist system.
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From this individualistic purview the most authentic experience that Kelsen observed, in political, economic, and sociological life, was that individuals or states were constantly struggling for their interests. The characterization of individuals as competitors is also the result of theorizing sociology and politics using an apparatus of philosophical categories reduced to economic concepts:
Hence relativism is the world outlook presupposed in the democratic idea. Democracy assigns equal value to the political will of everyone, just as it has equal respect for every political belief and opinion. It therefore gives every political conviction an equal chance to express itself and gain a hearing in free competition for the minds of men. 91 The label of international or national was of no use to distinguish the struggle of interests in society, in the sense that the international society would be of Hobbesian type and the national society one which produced human social relations. 92 No, for Kelsen the social and the political was always a struggle. 93 Thus the definition of common interest: 88 Kelsen, Vom Wesen, supra note 17, at 72. 89 Kelsen, 'Théorie Générale du Droit International Public, Problèmes Choisis', IV Recueil des Cours (1932) 121, at 144. 90 He was comparing it with other autocratic forms, like socialism: Kelsen, supra note 24, at 242. 91 combination of individualism and evolutionism and the protection of the struggle of interests becomes a universal legal protection of the 'fittest', to paraphrase Herbert Spencer. 99 After all, Kelsen was observing nature. Eventually, the notion of struggle and competition required a counter-notion that in this context was 'peace'. Probably for this reason, the cause of peace became an integral part of the main political projects thriving at the first half of the 20th century, and particularly in Kelsen's. 100 To that extent it might be suggested that international law in the last century has the distinguishing feature of pacifism at the service of either the struggle between or the solidarity of interests. 101 More inclined to the former than to the latter, Kelsen stated that:
'Peace' need not mean 'justice', not even in the sense of a solidarity of interests. Only one group may be interested in 'peace', namely the one whose interests are better preserved by this order than those of other groups. 102 To be sure, at the beginning of the century many were theorizing about 'interests' and depicting the state by reference to evolutionary theories. 103 The fact that Kelsen was a deep theorist or, more correctly, an epistemologist, in a deeply theoretical academic environment, is what marked the difference between him and jurists of the preceding generation or of other schools. 104 Moreover, as mentioned before, he put similar effort into his philosophical and sociological studies as he did into legal science, which explains why the Pure Theory functions so admirably: it evidently has a strong theoretical foundation. However, his work becomes the target of a simple but important critique: if one does not accept his political, ontological, and epistemological premises in the observation of reality -that it was constituted by a struggle of interests -the normative side of the theory does not make sense. 105 Furthermore, Kelsen himself appraised as political neither his atomistic view of society nor his description of the political sphere as a struggle of opposed interests. Rather he took that to be a scientific premise, a 'given'. It is therefore through the concept of science that he defended his particular politics. From this it followed that atomism of interests was his most important tool for theorizing.
The weakest side of the theory lay in the way that power was thought to be organized at what Kelsen would call the Sein level; that is to say, the level of reality. While Kelsen's sphere of normativity might carry a valid claim about its neutrality, the organization of power within the sphere in which the natural and political struggle of interests takes place is never neutral, and much less so in the international realm. Kelsen never addressed theoretically, in a direct manner, the question of power in the political struggle. As Kennedy suggests, power served him as the silent 'other' that was able to fulfil its function only by remaining unaddressed. 106 For a long period, the solution 'to power' in his exposition of the pure theory lay more than anywhere else in science as the impartial arbiter. 107 However, to use scientific argument was, in his case, to enter on a circular path, because to be scientific was, for Kelsen, to accept as a premise that the world was made up of individuals as competitors who needed a universal law (cosmopolitanism) to serve as a channel to resolve their conflicts and, for the most part, to do that using a technical method. Therefore, scientific argument did not genuinely serve the purpose of shedding light onto the identity of the power structures of the world and how to challenge them; it only served as a justification for legitimizing the universal struggle.
Nevertheless Kelsen critically challenged the legal normative structure -the 'classical' legal powers -of his times from his very first works on legal theory. 108 While he denied as a postulate that there was any power in the normative order other than legal power -thus his famous dictum that the state and other organizations are legal orders 109 -he repeated with equal constancy that political life was a struggle of interests, and he did this usually in order to dispel any illusions about justice, community, and so on. The purity of law was not supposed to have an impact on the political struggle of interests -however, law appeared to be an outcome of that struggle for power:
The problem of natural law is the eternal problem of what lies behind positive law. And whoever seeks the answer will find, I fear, neither the absolute truth of metaphysics nor the absolute justice of natural law. Whoever lifts the veil without closing his eyes will confront the gaping stare of the Gorgon's naked power. 110 The fact that law derived from the authority of power was for Kelsen unquestionable.
understood. The problematic aspect of these doctrines is that they reduce the notion of (international) politics to an ideology of 'common interests', and in the course of the 20th century, increasingly, to that of a struggle over interests, and in this way they invert the potential social character of law. From serving sociability and enabling politics, law is turned into a channel for the expression of conflicts of interest and their resolution. Since the concepts of 'politics' and 'society' are defined in a very particular manner on the basis of the 'conflicts of interests', neither of these two principles can be defended as being at the service of 'neutrality'. Indeed, neither 'society' nor 'political demos' can be defined by its conflicts, much less by its 'conflicts about interests'. Not even the arch-Hobbist, Thomas Hobbes himself, attempted that definition.
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For Hobbes, society reflected the willingness of individuals to unite to secure their safety.
117 Similarly, the norm is not exhaustively or even properly defined as a means to resolve conflicts about interests, but rather through the ensuing social organization.
The type of thinking of economic legal positivism was kept by no means confined to an antique treatise of international law or a sophisticated Kelsenian legal theory, but was transposed to the theory of international law during the 20th century, as is apparent, for instance, in the work of American author Philip C. Jessup (1897-1986). In his A Modern Law of Nations he provides a textbook example of the type of international legal reasoning founded on conflicts of interests which the empty normativity of law helps to channel. Jessup was a leading figure of 20th century US international law, whose impressive professional life included being the assistant to and biographer of Elihu Root, assistant secretary-general of the UN Monetary and Financial Conference (the Bretton Woods conference), and Judge of the International Court of Justice (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) .
In A Modern Law of Nations he located the history of the development of the international law on state responsibility for injury to aliens within the broader context of 'the history of "imperialism" or "dollar diplomacy"'. The American international lawyer understood the scramble for markets and raw materials, and governments' desire for political influence in certain countries, as representing a search, on the part of the developed countries, for outlets for the investment of surplus funds and for human energies. As a consequence, law was required to protect those enterprising individuals. State responsibility for injury to individuals was first articulated through claims made by the home state of the injured individual in arbitral commissions and tribunals, but increasingly through the individual's or corporation's right of direct access to international tribunals. 118 After having correctly noted the imperialist aspect of the 116 Kelsen viewed his theory as superseding any social contract theory: '[t]he supposition maintained by the natural law doctrine of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the State originates in a social contract concluded by sovereign individuals in a state of nature long since has been abandoned and replaced by another hypothesis according to which the State comes into existence through hostile conflicts between social groups of different economic structure.' Later he conceded that the 'optimistic' theory of the social doctrine was not 'entirely false', and that the 'pessimist' theory of the forcible subjugation' could not be taken as 'entirely correct': H. Kelsen, Peace through Law, supra note 100, at 6-7. 117 Hobbes, supra note 65. 118 P.C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1958), at 94-111, quotation at 96. public law. 123 In the light of the challenges that lie ahead for international lawyers in the 21st century, now may be an auspicious moment to propose revision of the politics of interests of international law.
Many would agree that the pattern of interests forming a foundation of law has not exhausted and cannot exhaust lawyers' imagination, especially if they are interested in grasping international law as 'part of the glue that holds people, positions, and places in dynamic relations one another, the sinews that link centres and peripheries, and the cloak that obscures the dynamic operations of hierarchy'. 124 A brief look at reality helps one to see that that is real. However, it may not always be quite so selfevident as it may appear that there are different -sometimes competing, sometimes compatible -philosophies or anti-philosophies on which international law may be grounded. The reason for this is that international legal theory has relied for too long a period on the received traditions of our international lawyer ancestors. I hope I have demonstrated that Lassa Oppenheim and Hans Kelsen were both political lawyers and profound thinkers who sought to respond to what they perceived as the demands of their times. This article is an invitation to follow their path.
